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ARTICLE
VFATA: VIRGINIA'S FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Michael J. Davidson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Virginia joined the growing body of states that have enacted
some version of a civil false claims act.' The Virginia Fraud Against Tax-
payers Act (VFATA) is based on and closely mirrors the highly successful
federal civil False Claims Act (FCA).2 As the VFATA becomes more
widely used as a vehicle for challenging fraud, Virginia courts and
practitioners will likely look to the FCA and associated interpretive case
law when applying the VFATA.3 This article will discuss the general
development of federal and state false claims acts, the VFATA in
particular, and compare the VFATA to its federal counterpart. Further, this
article will provide a general overview of the benefits and criticisms of civil
false claims acts that will likely be applied to the VFATA, and will
ultimately conclude that the benefits of such acts outweigh their
disadvantages.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACTS
The federal False Claims Act was enacted during the Civil War in
response to massive fraud being committed by defense contractors against
the United States.4 Union soldiers opened ammunition crates and found
sawdust rather than gunpowder, and cavalry units reported being charged
multiple times for the same horses.5 Contractors supplied the Army with
t Michael J. Davidson, J.D., College of William & Mary, 1988; LL.M. (Military
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the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., which is the office responsible for
nationwide administration of the False Claims Act (FCA). The opinions contained in this
article are those of the author and do not reflect the position of any federal agency.
1. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 36.
3. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
4. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(100 Stat. 3153) 5266, 5273.
5. ANDY PASZTOR, WHEN THE PENTAGON WAS FOR SALE 11 (1995).
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boots made of cardboard and provided unseaworthy ships to transport the
soldiers.6 The Union Army purchased uniforms and blankets that turned out
to be "little better than trash," and fell apart after minimal exposure to the
elements.7
The original version of the False Claims Act contained both civil and
criminal remedies for the knowing submission of false claims to the
government.8 In addition, the Act contained a qui tam provision,9 which
permits an individual to bring suit on behalf of the federal government as a
sovereign.'0 The current version of the civil FCA, codified at 31 U.S.C. §§
3729-3733, is now the federal government's primary tool to combat and
deter fraud when "payment of government monies, or to federally funded
entities using government funds" is involved." Although the original FCA
was enacted to combat defense procurement fraud, the majority of the
government's FCA recoveries are now in the area of health care fraud.1 2
Further, the civil FCA has proven extremely lucrative for the federal
government. Since 1986, the United States has recovered more than $20
billion.13
6. JAMES B. HELMER, JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION 38 (3d ed.
2002).
7. JAMES F. NAGLE, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 205 (1992).
8. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(100 Stat. 3153) 5266, 5273.
9. Id. at 5275. The term "qui tam" comes from "the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means 'who pursues this action on our
Lord the King's behalf as well as his own.' "Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n. 1 (2000). Qui tam provisions existed in both early Roman
and Anglo-Saxon law, and were common in the American colonies. R. Harrison Smith,
Commentary, A Key Time for Qui Tam: The False Claims Act and Alabama, 58 ALA. L.
REV. 1199, 1200 (2007).
10. CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAuD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT §
12:2, at 747 (2004).
11. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAMACTIONS 1-3 (3d ed. Supp. 2008);
see United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 302 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating the
FCA is the "primary means by which the Government combats and deters fraud"). The
criminal False Claims Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006).
12. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $2 Billion for
Fraud Against the Government in FY 2007; More Than $20 Billion Since 1986, (Nov. 1,
2007) ("As in the last several years, health care accounted for the lion's share of fraud
settlements and judgments.....) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov.
13. Id.
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In 1987, California became the first state to enact a false claims act
designed to combat fraud committed against state and local governments.
14
The California FCA is a direct by-product of the public awareness
surrounding the significant reforms of the federal civil False Claims Act.15
Although the California FCA was largely inactive until the early 1990s, its
use has grown dramatically since then.'
6
Patterned after the federal civil False Claims Act, the California statute
also contains a qui tam provision. 7 However, the California FCA does not
exactly mirror its federal counterpart. For example, unlike the federal civil
FCA, the California FCA imposes liability "upon anyone who is a
'beneficiary of an inadvertently submitted false claim' who later discovers
the false claim and fails to report it within a 'reasonable time' after
discovery.' 8 Further, like the FCA, the California legislation provides for a
maximum monetary limit on its penalty provision, but unlike the federal
Act, the California FCA has no minimum. 19 The California FCA's qui tam
provision is also more generous than the federal version.20 For example,
when the government does not intervene in a case, the maximum recovery
under the federal civil FCA is thirty percent, whereas the California FCA
provides for a maximum recovery of fifty percent.
2
'
In 2003, Virginia joined the federal government as well as twenty-two
states and the District of Columbia when it enacted a civil false claims act
that includes a qui tam provision.22 In addition to Virginia and California,
these states include Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
14. SYLVIA, supra note 10, § 12:1, at 747. While the federal civil FCA is "proven to be a
powerful tool in combating fraud," some states have chosen to enact even stronger false
claims acts. James W. Taylor & Brian Taugher, The California False Claims Act, 25 PuB.
CONT. L.J. 315, 316 (1996).
15. SYLvIA, supra note 10, § 12:3, at 748.
16. Taylor & Taugher, supra note 14, at 316.
17. City of Hawthorne ex rel. Wohlner v. H&C Disposal Co., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 312, 313
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
18. SYLVIA, supra note 10, § 12:3, at 748 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12650(8)).
Hawaii's FCA also contains a similar provision. Id. § 12:20, at 761.
19. Id. § 12:3, at 749. The federal civil FCA provides for a penalty of $5,500 to
$11,000. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006); 28 C.F.RI § 85.3(a)(9) (2008).
20. SYLVIA, supra note 10, § 12:3, at 749.
21. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2); SYLVIA, supra note 10, § 12:3, at 749.
22. Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, State False Claims Acts,
http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
2009]
HeinOnline -- 3 Liberty U.L Rev. 3 2009
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
Texas, and Wisconsin.23 Additionally, two major cities, Chicago and New
York City, have enacted similar legislation.24
Further, because of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 200525 and the
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), it is likely that other states
that have not enacted a false claims act will do so. 2 6 The DRA provides a
financial incentive to states to enact a false claims act, if such enactment
addresses Medicaid fraud.2 7 If a state false claims act complies with the
DRA, "the Federal medical assistance percentage with respect to any
amounts recovered under a State action brought under such law, shall be
decreased by 10 percentage points.,, 28 "The FMAP is the percentage of total
state Medicaid funding that comes from the federal government, as opposed
to the state." 29 For any amount a state recovers through a false claims act,
the state must pay the federal government the FMAP, but the DRA
decreases that amount by ten percent.30 In other words, the state may keep
an additional ten percent of all recoveries.31
One state taking advantage of federal incentives to enact a false claims
act is Virginia. The Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (VFATA)32 is
one of thirteen DRA compliant state false claim acts.33 As a result, Virginia
is "eligible to receive an additional ten percent on all Medicaid recoveries
obtained through VFATA.
34
III. THE VIRGINIA FRAUD AGAINST TAXPAYERS ACT (VFATA)
The VFATA went into effect on January 1, 2003 after receiving wide-
spread support within the General Assembly.35 The VFATA is based on and
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
26. Cf Smith, supra note 9 (advocating for an Alabama false claims act).
27. See, e.g., the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-216.1-
216.19 (2007).
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396h(a) (West Supp. 2008); Andrew B. Eills, The Federal Deficit
Reduction Act of 2006: Efforts to Cut Spending, Incentives to Enact New False Claims Acts,
48 N.H.B.J. 6, 11 (2007).
29. Eills, supra note 28, at 11.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. VA. CODEANN. §§ 8.01-216.1-216.19 (2007).
33. Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, State False Claims Acts,
http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
34. 2007 VA. MEDICAID FRAuD CONTROL UNIT ANN. REP. 4.
35. Alan Cooper, New State Law Models Federal Act, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 15,
2003, at B3 ("The legislation passed without a dissenting vote at any stage.").
[Vol. 3:1
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mirrors the language of the federal civil False Claims Act.3 6 Shortly after
enacting the VFATA, Virginia created a Special Qui Tam Unit to
coordinate the investigation and prosecution of qui tam cases, permitting
the Medicaid Fraud Unit to borrow investigators from other state agencies
to pursue medical qui tam cases.37
Most state false claims acts have little interpretive case law,38 and the
VFATA serves as no exception to the rule. As of January 2009, there were
no reported VFATA cases and little mention of unreported cases existed
elsewhere. 39 The first VFATA case was filed by a relator in April 2003 and
alleged that a contractor had overcharged the Virginia Department of
Transportation for equipment and services. 40 However, the number of
VFATA cases is gradually increasing, and eventually the Virginia judicial
system will begin to render interpretive decisions. A December 2005 law
review article reported thirty-five filed VFATA cases of which none had
41yet to result in a recovery.
At the beginning of 2008, there were approximately 100 pending qui tam
cases, the vast majority of which are being handled by Virginia's Medicaid
Fraud Control Unit (MCFU).42 Furthermore, the MCFU has reported a
gradual increase in its case load, progressing from fifty-two open cases at
the end of fiscal year 2006, the majority of which were filed against
pharmaceutical companies. The case load increased to eighty-two open
cases by the end of fiscal year 2007.43
The fact that the bulk of VFATA cases is in the health care fraud area is
not surprising. Because Medicaid is funded by both the Commonwealth and
36. 2006 VA. MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNIT ANN. REP. 18 ("This Act is patterned
after the Federal False Claims Act....").
37. James F. Barger, Jr. et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical Study of
Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 465, 480-81, app. B, at Question 11(b)
(2005); see also 2006 VA. MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNIT ANN. REP. 18 ("The 2005
General Assembly approved an increase in appropriation to create the Civil Investigations
Squad to be placed within the MFCU.").
38. SYLVIA, supra note 10, § 12:1, at 747 ("There is little case law interpreting most of
these statutes.").
39. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-216.1-216.19 (2007 & Supp. 2008).
40. Michelle Washington, State Plans To Prosecute Contractor, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Dec. 3, 2003, at B3.
41. Barger et al., supra note 37, app. B, at Questions IV(a) (reporting that a settlement
was being negotiated), IV(b).
42. E-mail from Michael Judge, Deputy Director, Prosecution and Litigation, Medicaid
Fraud Control Unit (Jan. 24,2008) (on file with author).
43. Id.
2009]
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the federal government,44 a relator who intends to file a federal FCA lawsuit
can allege a violation of the VFATA as well.45 In turn, the claimant is
eligible for a recovery under both statutes.46
Most state false claims acts, including the VFATA, are modeled at least
in part after the federal civil False Claims Act.47 Accordingly, state courts
look to federal case law for interpretive guidance,48 and Virginia courts will
likely do the same. Indeed, because the two statutes are so similar, case law
interpreting the federal civil FCA should serve as persuasive authority when
interpreting the VFATA.49
The VFATA and the FCA contain similar provisions. With the exception
of language distinguishing application of the statute to the Commonwealth,
rather than the United States, the sections describing the conduct giving rise
to liability are virtually identical.50 Generally, both statutes subject any
person to civil liability that knowingly makes or presents, or causes to be
made or presented, a false claim, or conspires to get a false claim paid.5' In
the Fourth Circuit, any false statement or claim must also be "material,"
that is, having "a natural tendency to influence agency action or is capable
of influencing agency action., 52 Without squarely addressing the issue, a
recent Supreme Court decision appeared to agree with the Fourth Circuit,
suggesting that FCA liability requires proof of materiality. 53 Further, both
44. 2007 VA. MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNIT ANN. REP. 18 ("Medicaid is funded by
both the federal and state governments ....").
45. 2006 VA. MEDICAID FRAuD CONTROL UNIT ANN. REP. 18.
46. Id. ("[T]he relater [sic] will be eligible for a percentage of the state share of the
Medicaid recovery as well as the federal share.").
47. SYLVIA, supra note 9, § 12:2, at 747.
48. Id. § 12:1, at 747 ("For those state statutes modeled after the federal False Claims
Act, it is likely that federal precedent will be valuable in construing the statutes, at least
where the provisions are similar or identical."); see, e.g., State v. Altus Fin., S.A., 116 P.3d
1175, 1184 (Cal. 2005) ("[Tlhe CFCA 'is patterned on similar federal legislation' and it is
appropriate to look to precedent construing the equivalent federal act.").
49. See United States ex rel. Stierli v. Shasta Servs. Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111
(E.D. Cal. 2006) ("Because of the similarity between the [FCA and California FCA], federal
decisions are deemed persuasive authority in interpreting both state and federal
provisions.").
50. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l)-(7) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(A)(l)-(7) (2007).
51. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l)-(7); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(A)(1)-(7).
52. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999);
see also United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 378 (4th
Cir. 2008); SYLVIA, supra note 10, § 4:57, at 198-99 (recognizing that the issue of whether
materiality is required "has generated significant debate").
53. Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2126
(2008) ("[A] plaintiff asserting a § 3729(a)(2) claim must prove that the defendant intended
[Vol. 3:1
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statutes contain causes of action for reverse claims; that is, making, using,
or causing to be made or used, a false statement or record to both statutes
only require that a case be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.54
Furthermore, both define a "claim" broadly using virtually identical
language. 55 Under the VFATA and the FCA, a claim includes:
any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise,
for money or property that is made to a contractor, grantee, or
other recipient if the [Commonwealth/United States Govern-
ment] provides any portion of the money or property that is
requested or demanded, or if the [Commonwealth/Government]
will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any
portion of the money or property that is requested or
demanded.
56
Although a FCA claim is defined broadly, "neither mistaken conduct nor
negligence is actionable under the False Claims Act."57 Similarly,
"reasonable, but incorrect, interpretation[s] of a contract" generally will not
support FCA liability.58 Further, both statutes exclude tax-related claims as
a cause of action.59 Also, the remedy provisions of both statutes provide for
treble damages in addition to civil penalties ranging from $5,500 to
$11,000. 60 Under the FCA, civil penalties are mandatory and are imposed
for each false claim.6' The penalties are not dependent upon proof of actual
damages, and the court determines the amount of each penalty.62
that the false record or statement be material to the Government's decision to pay or approve
the false claim."); id. at 2130-31 (for purposes of § 3729(a)(3), "it must be established that
[the alleged conspirators] agreed that the false record or statement would have a material
effect on the Government's decision to pay the false or fraudulent claim.").
54. 31 U.S.C. § 373 1(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.9.
55. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.2.
56. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.2.
57. United States ex rel. Phillips v. Pediatric Servs. of America, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d
717, 733 (W.D.N.C. 2001).
58. United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719, 730 (N.D.
Il1. 2007).
59. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(e); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(D).
60. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(A); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9)
(2008).
61. United States v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 720, 726-27 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
62. Id. at 720, 727.
2009]
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For most provisions, the express language of both statutes only requires
that the government prove a knowing violation.63 Further, both statutes
define "knowing" broadly.64 Neither the United States nor the Common-
wealth must prove specific intent, and "knowing" means that "a person,
with respect to information (i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii)
acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii)
acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information."65 The
1986 Amendments to the FCA eased the scienter requirement in order "to
address 'the problem of the "ostrich-like" refusal to learn of information
which an individual, in the exercise of prudent judgment, had reason to
know."' 66 Presumably, liability under the VFATA, like the FCA, extends to
"those who ignore obvious warning signs."
67
Although the term "knowing" is interpreted broadly, it is not without
limitation. Mere negligence, or an "innocent mistake," is insufficient to
establish liability.68 Similarly, federal courts have opined that "a difference
in interpretation growing out of a disputed legal question,'69 and "the
common failings of scientists or engineers,' 7° will not support liability.
Because neither the VFATA nor the FCA specifically provide for a
knowing violation of a conspiracy, it remained an open question whether
specific intent to defraud was required.7' Both statutes impose liability on a
person who "conspires to defraud [the Commonwealth/Government] by
getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid., 72 Under the FCA,
"[g]eneral civil conspiracy principles apply,, 73 and some courts looked to
63. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)-(2), (6)-(7); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(A)(1)-(2), (6)-
(7).
64. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(C).
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(C); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).
66. Crane Helicopter Servs., Inc., v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 410, 433 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
67. Id.
68. Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp., 276 F.3d 1032,
1053 (8th Cir. 2002) (negligence insufficient); United States ex rel. Humphrey v. Franklin-
Williamson Human Servs., Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 862, 867 (S.D. I11. 2002) ("innocent
mistakes or negligence will not suffice"); Crane Helicopter Servs., 45 Fed. Cl. at 434 ("[A]n
innocent mistake or mere negligence such as a math error or flawed reasoning may be
excused.").
69. Franklin-Williamson Human Servs., 189 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
70. United States ex rel. Bettis v. Odebrecht Contractors of Cal., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d
272, 277 (D.D.C. 2004).
71. See SYLVIA, supra note 10, § 4:4, at 120.
72. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(A)(3).
73. United States v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 726 (N.D. I11. 2006); see also United
States ex rel. Phillips v. Pediatric Servs. of America, 142 F. Supp. 2d 717, 733 (W.D.N.C.
2001).
[Vol. 3:1
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these general principles to find a heightened level of scienter.74 Other courts
simply assumed that the scienter element was the same for a conspiracy to
defraud as it is for a knowing presentation of a false claim.75
In Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,76 the
Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed the issue. In Allison
Engine, two qui tam relators brought suit based on allegedly false invoices
submitted by a subcontractor on a Navy contract.77 With regard to the
conspiracy cause of action, the Court stated that § 3729(a)(3) of the FCA
requires proof "that the conspirators intended 'to defraud the Govern-
ment.' ' 78 The Court posited that "it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that
the alleged conspirators agreed upon a fraud scheme that had the effect of
causing a private entity to make payments using money obtained from the
Government., 79 If the alleged misconduct involves an agreement to make a
false statement or record, the plaintiff must also establish "that the
conspirators had the purpose of 'getting' the false record or statement to
bring about the Government's payment of a false or fraudulent claim.,
80
In addition to the government bringing suit, the qui tam provisions of
both the VFATA and the FCA permit a private person to bring suit on
behalf of that person and the sovereign.81 Known as relators or whistle-
blowers, these persons bring suit in the name of the government, 82 the real
party in interest, 83 and relators then act on behalf of the government.
84
Because of this unique relationship between relators and the federal govern-
ment, "a joint-prosecutorial privilege exists" between the United States and
relators.85 Further, both statutes contain provisions designed to protect
whistleblowers against retaliation.
86
74. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Reagan v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare Sys.,
274 F. Supp. 2d 824, 857 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
75. SYLVIA, supra note 10, § 4:4, at 120.
76. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).
77. Id. at 2127.
78. Id. at2130.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(A).
82. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(A).
83. United States ex rel. Zissler v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 154 F.3d 870, 872
(8th Cir. 1998); United States er rel. McCready v. Colunbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 F.
Supp. 2d 114, 120 (D.D.C. 2003).
84. BOESE, supra note 11, at 4-36.1.
85. United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 27 (D.D.C. 2002).
86. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-216.8.
2009]
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Relators initiate the lawsuit by serving upon the government a motion for
judgment under the VFATA or a complaint under the FCA as well as a
"written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information
the person possesses .... The motion for judgment or complaint is filed
in camera and remains under seal for at least sixty days under the FCA and
120 days under the VFATA. 88 During this period, the government investi-
gates and determines whether it will intervene in the case.89 Under both
statutes, the government may request further time to make the intervention
decision,90 and under the FCA, the government frequently requests and
receives extensions of time.91 If the government elects to intervene, it
assumes control over the lawsuit; otherwise, the government can decline to
intervene and the relator may prosecute the case.92
Even in cases where the government declines to intervene, it still
exercises significant control over the case's ultimate outcome. Upon
request, and at the government's expense, relators must provide the govern-
ment with a copy of all pleadings and deposition transcripts.93 Under both
statutes, the case may not be dismissed without the written authorization of
the court and the respective Attorney General. 94 Further, both statutes
permit the government to settle or dismiss a case over the objection of the
relator after notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 9'
Under both statutes, the financial incentives for relators to bring suit are
substantial. When the government intervenes, a relator under both statutes
is entitled to fifteen to twenty-five percent "of the proceeds of the action or
settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person
substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action. 96 If the
government declines to intervene, a successful relator is entitled to twenty-
five to thirty percent of the proceeds, in addition to an award against the
defendant for reasonable expenses, attorneys' fees, and costs. 97 However, if
the relator "is convicted of criminal conduct arising from [his or her] role in
87. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(B).
88. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(B).
89. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(B).
90. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(C).
91. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Permison v. Superlative Technologies, Inc., 492 F.
Supp. 2d 561, 563 (E.D. Va. 2007) (United States received three extensions of time).
92. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(D).
93. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.6(F).
94. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5(A).
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.6(B)-(C).
96. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(A).
97. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(B).
[Vol. 3:1
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the violation of [the FCA or VFATA], that person shall be dismissed from
the civil action and shall not receive any share of the proceeds of the
action." 98 If the court finds that the relator planned and initiated the
misconduct giving rise to the lawsuit, under the FCA the court may reduce
the relator's share of the proceeds, but under the VFATA the relator
recovers nothing.
99
Unique to the VFATA is the fact that inmates incarcerated in a state or
local correction facility may not bring suit.100 Additionally, current and
former Commonwealth employees may not bring suit based on information
they acquired as Commonwealth employees unless they "first, in good
faith, exhausted existing internal procedures for reporting and seeking
recovery of the falsely claimed sums through official channels and unless
the Commonwealth failed to act on the information provided within a
reasonable period of time."
10
'
IV. LONG TERM OUTLOOK
If the federal civil FCA serves as an example, a robust VFATA in
general, and its qui tam provisions in particular, will be met with various
forms of criticism. One of the most controversial features of the FCA has
been its qui tam provision, which the VFATA mirrors. 10 2 Disgruntled
employees may use actual or threatened FCA litigation "to deflect
legitimate discipline, extract unwarranted termination arrangements, or
second-guess valid management decisions. '' 03 Further, a FCA may serve as
another vehicle for meritless litigation'°4 or "creative" lawyering as relators
98. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(C).
99. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.7(C). In addition, the VFATA
contains a public disclosure bar modeled after the federal FCA, which generally prohibits
private persons from receiving a reward if their claim is based upon information already in
the public domain, unless they were an original source of such information. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-216.8. For a comprehensive review of the public disclosure bar and original source
exception, see Joel D. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception" to the False
Claims Act's "Public Disclosure Bar," 1 LIBERTY L. REv. 111 (2006).
100. VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-216.8.
101. Id.
102. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)-(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.5-216.7.
103. William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in
Government Contracting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1826 (1996).
104. Id. at 1820 ("[T]he DOJ seldom has moved to dismiss a qui tam suit on the ground
that the underlying substantive allegations were threadbare."); see Smith, supra note 9, at
1212 ("The primary criticism of statutes that encourage whistleblower suits-such as the
FCA and its state equivalents-is that the possibility of a generous recovery increases the
number of frivolous suits and leads to the creation of a hostile business environment.").
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attempt to fit routine business disputes under the FCA's broad umbrella.10 5
Companies must bear the inconvenience and substantial expense of
defending against such lawsuits and may elect to settle these cases for
purely business reasons. Qui tam lawsuits may lead to "increased industry-
wide costs" and "increase[d] medical prices."' 6 Also, rather than reporting
misconduct to corporate management, false claims acts arguably provide
relators with a financial incentive to allow the fraud to continue in order to
increase the amount of damages and concomitantly, the relator's
recovery. 1
07
False claims acts are subject to other forms of criticism as well. For
example, adding a state false claims act to the government's already
complex anti-fraud regime, consisting of criminal, civil, administrative, and
contractual remedies, makes it even more difficult for all parties to achieve
a global settlement.' 8 Further, the aggressive use of a FCA will require a
business to devote greater resources to compliance efforts and may
ultimately either discourage businesses from entering into contractual
arrangements with the government or force a small or struggling concern
out ofbusiness.'9
However, despite these criticisms, many of which are legitimate, on the
whole federal and state FCAs provide significant benefits, which more than
outweigh any disadvantages. The FCA and VFATA provide a legal
mechanism to make the government whole for fraud committed against it.
Indeed, the VFATA provides a separate vehicle to attack fraud in state-
105. See United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 373
(4th Cir. 2008) ("Relators have consistently sought to shoehorn what is, in essence, a breach
of contract action into a claim that is cognizable under the False Claims Act."); BOESE,
supra note 11, at 1-5 ("[A]II the prosecutors-qui tam relators, federal and state attorneys-
have become extremely creative, attempting to apply the statute's treble damages and
penalty provisions to unusual circumstances never viewed as traditional 'fraud' cases.").
106. Stephen Moore & Phil Kerpen, Blowing the Whistle on Jackpot Justice, at *3 (April
22, 2005), available at http://www.philkerpen.com/?q=node/25.
107. Kovacic, supra note 103, at 1829 ("Rather than promptly bringing problems to
management's attention, employees may allow them to persist-thus increasing the size of
the injury and the relator's potential recovery-and to gather evidence for pursuing a qui tam
suit."); see also Moore & Kerpen, supra note 106, at *2 ("Whistleblowers often quietly
collect evidence for months while fraud continues.").
108. See Barger et al., supra note 37, at 486.
109. See Michael J. Davidson, Governmental Responses to Elder Abuse and Neglect in
Nursing Homes: The Criminal Justice System and the Civil False Claims Act, 12 ELDER L.J.
327, 347 (2004) (discussing opposition to the aggressive use of Florida's FCA against the
nursing home industry); William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to
Participation in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 201 (1998).
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funded programs that are beyond the reach of the FCA."0 In a similar vein,
these statutes provide a financial disincentive that discourages companies
and individuals from defrauding the government. Beyond the monetary
sanctions, the FCA and VFATA provide a mechanism to improve the
quality of government-funded programs. For example, the FCA has been
used effectively to improve the quality of care in nursing homes that
participate in Medicare or Medicaid."' Not only does the FCA encourage
potential relators on staff in nursing homes to report elder abuse, but the
FCA also provides an incentive for nursing homes to identify, report, and
correct quality of care deficiencies. In addition, the government may
mandate improvements in patient care as part of a compliance agreement
when settling FCA cases.'
1 2
Additionally, relators serve a beneficial function with regard to
maintaining the integrity of the government's programs. As insiders,
relators have unique access to information concerning fraud, waste, and
abuse being committed by their organization and/or by other corporate
employees. The VFATA and FCA both provide relators with a financial
incentive to report misconduct. Further, relators serve as a resource that
offsets inadequate government contract and law enforcement staffing." 3
If measured by no other standard than its ability to recover money for the
government, the qui tam provisions of the federal civil FCA have been a
tremendous success. During Fiscal Year 2007, the United States obtained
approximately $2 billion in civil FCA settlements and judgments, of which
$1.45 billion was attributable to qui tam lawsuits.' "4 A potential windfall for
Virginia and its relators may be achieved by joining a VFATA claim to a
FCA case when both federal and state funds are implicated." 5
V. CONCLUSION
As indicated by the increasing number of VFATA cases being filed, it
appears that the VFATA will soon enjoy a measure of the popularity
possessed by the federal civil FCA rather than remain as a relatively
obscure addition to the Virginia Code. To date, the VFATA has been
110. See Barger et al., supra note 37, at 487.
111. See Davidson, supra note 109, at 345, 350.
112. See id.
113. United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D.D.C. 2002)
("offset inadequate law-enforcement resources").
114. DOJ Press Release, supra note 12, at *1.
115. See Barger et al., supra note 37, at 485 ("[M]ost of the significant recoveries in the
states have resulted from states' ability to join federal law enforcement efforts and global
settlements.").
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underutilized, but the statute possesses enormous potential to deter fraud in
state-funded programs and to recover ill-gotten gains from those cheating
the state. Given the significant financial incentives to the Commonwealth
and to relators, particularly with health care fraud, it appears likely that this
enormous potential will soon be realized.
With few exceptions, the VFATA is a carbon copy of the FCA. By
mirroring the FCA, the General Assembly provided a ready-made body of
interpretive law for Virginia courts and practitioners.
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